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When  there  are  multiple  risks  threatening  the  loss  of  an  asset,  insurance
schemes  contingent  on  one  risk  alone  are  incomplete.  Two  issues  concerning
such  insurance  schemes  are  studied  here.  The  first  issue  relates  to  the
consequences  of  incompleteness  for  the  optimal  amount  of  insurance.  The  second
issue  relates  to  the  incentive  implications  of  incomplete  insurance.  We  find
that,  except  when  individuals  have  quadratic  utility  functions,  incompleteness
has  non-trivial  effects  on  the  optimal  insurance  contract.  When  marginal
utility  is  convex,  incompleteness  limits  the  amount  of  insurance.  An  increase
in  the  variance  of  the  individual's  income  (arising from  greater  uncertainty
about  the  uninsured  variable)  decreases the  optimal  level  of  insurance.  Also
for  a  class  of  utility  functions  which  includes  some  familiar  functional
forms,  increasing  risk  aversion  reduces the  optimal  amount  of  insurance.  As
for the  incentive  implication,  the  insurance  is  so  weak  for  decreasing  risk
averse  individuals  that  they  strictly  prefer  those  states  of  the  world  where
no  indemnity  is  forthcoming.  For  this  reason,  the  potential  moral  hazard  is
least  serious  for  this  class  of  utility  functions  and  the  incompleteness  of
insurance  helps  to  resolve  the  incentive  problem.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
When  there  are  multiple  risks  threatening  the  loss  of  an  asset,
insurance  schemes  contingent  on  one  risk  alone  are  incomplete.  In  the  analysis
of  such  insurance  schemes,  two  issues  have  received  attention  in the
literature.  The  first  issue  relates  to  the  consequences  of  incompleteness  for
the  optimal  amount  of  insurance.  This  is  studied  here  by  answering  two
questions.  First,  how  does  the  existence  of  a  background  uninsurable  risk
modify  the  optimal  amount  of  insurance  and  second,  how  do  risk  attitudes  of
individuals  influence  the  optimal  insurance?  The  second  issue  concerns  the
incentive  implications  of  incomplete  insurance.  In  this  paper,  both  of  these
issues  are  examined  for  the  case  of  multiplicative  risks.
The  specification  of  multiplicative  risks  is  natural  in  contexts  where
the  assets  that  are  insured  against  physical  loss  are  also  subject  to
uninsured  fluctuations  in  unit  value.  Some  examples  of  multiplicative  risks
are:
(a)  when  a  firm  (as  in  agriculture)  faces  price  and  output  uncertainty  but
can  obtain  insurance  against  only  one  risk  (e.g.,  crop  insurance).
(b)  when  a  work  of  art  can  be  insured  against  loss  of  theft  but  not  against
changes  in  its  market  value.
(c)  when  an  exporter  can  obtain  insurance  against  exchange  rate  risks  but  not
against  fluctuations  in  world  market  price.
In  the  complete  market  case,  and  in  the  absence  of  informational
IThis  example  is  due  to  Turnbullasymmetries,  optimal  risk  sharing  between  a  risk  averse  individual  and  risk
neutral  insurance  firm  involves  equalization  of  marginal  utilities  and  hence
net  incomes  across  the  different  states.  If  there  is,  however,  a  second  source
of  risk  on  which  insurance  is  not  contingent  then  the  above  proposition  need
not  hold  and  marginal  utilities  may  no  longer  be  equalized.
As  a  consequence,  here  it  is  shown,  except  when  individuals  have
quadratic  utility  functions,  incompleteness  has  non-trivial  effects  on  the
optimal  insurance  contract.  First,  when  marginal  utility  is  convex,  the
existence  of  an  uninsurable  risk  reduces  the  amount  of  insurance.  An  increase
in  the  variance  of  the  individual's  income  (arising  from  greater  uncertainty
about  the  uninsured  variable)  decreases the  optimal  level  of  insurance.
Second,  the  agent's  risk  preference  and,  in  particular,  the  curvature  of  the
marginal  utility  function  is  important  in  determining  the  optimal  level  of
insurance.  For  a  class  of  utility  functions  which  includes  some  familiar
functional  forms,  increasing  risk  aversion  reduces the  optimal  amount  of
insurance.
As  for  the  incentive  implication,  we  find  the  optimal  insurance  to  be  so
limited  for  decreasing  risk  averse  individuals  that  they  strictly  prefer  those
states  of  the  world  where  no  indemnity  is  forthcoming  to  those  where  they
receive  indemnities.  For this  reason,  potential  moral  hazard  is  least  serious
for  this  class  of  utility  functions.  In  this  case  the  incompleteness  (due  to
the  uninsurable  risk)  of  insurance  helps  to  resolve  the  incentive  problem.
Relatior to Previous Work
The  problem  of  insuring  against  a  risk  x  when  an  uninsurable
background  risk  y  is  present  has  been  studied  by  a  number  of  researchers  (for
a  survey  see  Schlesinger  and  Doherty).  In  Doherty  and  Schlesinger,  and  in
2Mayers  and  Smith,  correlation  between  the  two  risks  has  been  shown  to  be
critical  in  determining  the  level  of  optimal  insurance.  An  implication  is  that
if  risks  are  independent,  the  optimal  insurance  against  risk  x  is  independent
of  risk  y.  As  will  be  noted  later,  this  result  is  a  consequence  of  the
assumption  of  additive  risks.  If  instead,  the  risks  interact  multiplicatively,
as  assumed  here,  the  flavor  of  the  analysis  is  altered  considerably.  In  the
model  presented  here,  although  the  risks  are  independent,  the  optimal
insurance  is  not  independent  of  the  uncertainty  about  the  uninsured  variable.
The  properties  of  optimal  insurance  when  there  are  multiple  risks  has
also  been  studied  in  terms  of  the  willingness  to  pay  for  the  removal  of  a  risk
x  when  a  risk  y  is  present.  In  such  circumstances,  individuals  who  are  more
risk  averse  (in  the  Arrow-Pratt  sense)  may  not  necessarily  be  willing  to  pay
larger  risk  premiums  (Ross;  Kihlstrom,  Romer  and  Williams;  Turnbull).  In  much
the  same  vein,  this  paper  identifies  situations  when  higher  risk  aversion
reduces  the  optimal  amount  of  insurance.  Also  for  the  case  of  multiplicative
risks,  Turnbull  found  the  individual's  willingness  to  pay  for  the  removal  of  a
single  risk  to  decrease  as  a  result  of  an  increase  in  uncertainty  about  the
uninsured  variable.  This  result  is  proved  for  decreasing  risk  averse  utility
functions.  This  paper  proves,  for  a  larger  class  of  utility  functions,  that
an  increase  in  the  riskiness  of  the  distribution  of  the  uninsured  variable
decreases  the  optimal  level  of  insurance.
In  the  complete  market  case,  and  in  the  absence  of  moral  hazard,  the
optimal  contract  is  such  that  the  insured  individual  is  indifferent
between  the  various  income  states.  If,  however,  the  contract  is  not  contingent
on  the  agent's  actions,  then  such  a  level  of  insurance  is  not  optimal  because
it  provides  no  incentive  for  the  agent  to take  actions  which  will  reduce  theprobability  of  losses.  Similarly,  in  an  incomplete  insurance  context,  the
optimality  of  contracts  in  the  presence  of  moral  hazard  has  been  investigated
by  Imai  et.al  and  Ito  and  Machina.  They  consider  unemployment  insurance
schemes  where  severance  payments  are  made  to  laid-off  workers.  But  "since
severance  payments  usually  do  not  depend  on  outcomes  at  alternative
opportunities  after  layoff,  they  are  considered  at  best  incomplete  insurance
for  layoff"  (Ito  and  Machina).  The  issue  that  is  investigated  is  whether  the
laid  off  worker  could  be  better  off,  in  an  ex-ante  sense,  than  the  retained
worker.  If  this  were  so,  it  would  obviously  introduce  the  moral  hazard
problem.  For  a  similar  question  in  our  model  of  multiplicative  risks,  we  find
the  incentive  problem  to  be  least  serious  for  individuals  with  decreasing  risk
averse  utility  functions.  This  is  because  the  background  risk  reduces  the
optimal  insurance  so  much  that  moral  hazard  problems  are  considerably
moderated.
Plan of  Paper
For  a  fairly  general  problem,  the  next  section  sets  out  a  model  of
incomplete  insurance  and  derives  the  condition  for optimal  insurance.  By
introducing  more  structure,  we  are  able  to  specialize  the  model  to  consider
the  case  of  additive  and  multiplicative  risks.  The  results  of  Doherty  and
Schlesinger  are  reviewed  for  the  additive  case.  The  multiplicative  case  is
pursed  in  Section  III,  where  the  effect  of  background  risk  on  the  optimal
insurance  is  completely  characterized.  In  Section  IV,  the  inverse
relationship  between  risk  aversion  and  the  level  of  optimal  insu,  nce  is
demonstrated  for  a  class  of  utility  functions  which  includes  some
familiar  functional  forms.
Sections  V  and  VI  consist  of  extensions  to  the  basic  model  of  Section  II.Since  the  incompleteness  of  insurance  is  intimately  tied  to the  absence  of
risk markets,  Section  V  considers  the  effect  on  the  optimal  insurance  due  to
the  introduction  of  a  market  for  the  uninsurable  risk.  Section  VI  allows
individual's  actions  to  affect  the  probability  distribution  of  insurable
losses.  If  the  agent's  actions  are  unobservable,  the  insurance  contract  cannot
be  contingent  on  it.  But  the  optimal  contract  must  take  into  account  the
agent's  optimal  actions  in  response  to  the  insurance  contract  (described  by
the  incentive  constraint).  The  analysis  considers  the  situations  in  which  the
incentive  constraint  is  likely  to  be  binding.  This  is  shown  to  depend  on  the
nature  of  risk  preferences  and  on  the  agent's  disutility  towards  work.  The
incentive  constraint  is  least  binding  for  decreasing  risk  averse  individuals.
In  fact,  if  the  marginal  cost  to  the  individual  of  his  actions  is  small,  the
incentive  constraint  for  decreasing  risk  averse  individuals  may  not  be  binding
i.e.,  moral  hazard  does  not  alter  the  optimal  insurance  contract.  The  analysis
also  reconsiders  the  effect  of  background  risk  on  the  optimal  insurance  in  the
context  of  moral  hazard.  Concluding  remarks  are  gathered  together  in
Section  VII.
II.  A  MODEL  OF  INCOMPLETE  INSURANCE
Let  w  be  the  value  of  owning  an  asset,  w  depends  on  the  state  of  the
world  w that  is  realized,  where  w is  an  element  of  the  state  space  Q.  An
insurance  contract  is  a  state  contingent  indemnity  schedule  I(w)  and  a  premium
P  that  is  paid  in  all  states.
Let  I(.)  partition  Q  into  Oc  and  nB  such  that
OG  =  (w  e  2:  I(w)  =  0)  and  Bg  =  Gw  e  Q:  I(w)  =  k)  where  k  is  any  arbitrary
positive  constant.  We  can  think  of  IQ  as  the  no-accident  state  of  the  world
(the  'good'  state)  and  of  Q 2B as  the  accident  state  of  the  world  (the  'bad'
5state).  If  Q  contains  at  least  three  elements,  a  description  of  the  state  of
the  world  in  terms  of  QG  and  Qg  is  incomplete  since  Qh or  2B  or  both  contain
at  least  two  elements.
Let  a  be  an  element  of  the  probability  vector  TI on  Q  where  IT is  exogenous
to  the  individual  seeking  insurance  . We  suppose  the  insurance  firm  is  risk
neutral  and  offers  actuarially  fair  insurance,  i.e.,  P  =  E  [  (Wc)I()]  =
IZWEB [x(w)]  yI  where  7  =  Ze  i](w)  . From  the  set  of  actuarially  fair
contracts  the  optimal  insurance  is  found  by  maximizing  the  expectation  of  an
increasing  and  strictly  concave  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  function.
(1)  Max  n)(I)  =  [  (n)U(w(uw )  - YDl)1+  Z  f()U(w()  +  (1 - +  )I)1
If  an  interior  solution  exists,  it  satisfies
0'(I)  =  (1  - 7)(E 2BC(w)U'(w(C)  +  (1  -r)I)-  )  T  I7(c)U'(w(()  - XI)  =  0
or
(2)  (1  - y)y2e  ((u)/y)U(w()  +  (1  - y)I)  - E  (n(w)/(17))U'(w()  - YTI)=  0
For  w  E  B,  IW(c)/  =  Prob(wcI  e  Rg)  and
for w  e  QG,  x(w)/(l-y)  =  Prob(wIW  E  C  ).
Rewriting  (2)  in  terms  of  the  conditional  probabilities,  the  optimal  I
satisfies,
(3)  q'(I)  =  (1  - X)yE[U'(w(c)  +  (1  - X)I)I  |B]  - E[U'(w(w)  - yrl)Ij]  =  0
The  optimal  insurance  equates  the  expected  marginal  utility  across  the
accident  and  no-accident  states  of  nature.  While  (3)  is  the  basic
optimality  condition  of  incomplete  insurance  schemes,  different  cases  arise
ZThe  exogeniety  assumption  is  relaxed  in  Section  VIdepending  upon  assumptions  about  Qc,  B  and  II.
To  introduce  more  structure,  suppose  that  the  randomness  in  w  the  value
of  owning  the  asset  is  induced  by  randomness  in  two  variables  x  and  y.  Then
the  state  of  the  world  is  described  by  the  pair  (x,y).  Assume  two  point
distributions  for  x  and  y,  with  outcomes  X1,X2  and  Y1,Y2  respectively.  Also
let  an  insurance  scheme  be  contingent  on  x  but  not  on  y  and  identify  the
no-accident  state  as  X,  and  the  accident  state  as  X2,  i.e.,  X1  > X2 . Or  more
formally,  C  =  {(Xi,YI),  (XI,Y 2)}  and  QB  =  {(X 2,Yi),  (X2,Y2)}.  Then  (3)
becomes
(4)  ~'(I)  =  (1  - )[E[U'(w(x,y) +  (1  - I)I)X 2 ]  - E[U'(w(x,y)  - yI)  Xz ]  =  0
The  Additive  Case
The  interaction  of  x  and  y  or  more  generally  the  manner  in  which  w
depends  on  x  and  y  matters  in  the  analysis  of  incomplete  insurance
schemes.  One  specification,  analyzed  by  Doherty  and  Schlesinger  is  when
w  =  x  +  y.  In  this  case,
(5)  7'(I)  =  (1  - )yE[U'(X 2  +  y  +  (1  - y)I)IX 2]  - E[U'(X1  +  y  - xI)|X1 ]]
If  no  background  risk  were  present,  i.e.,  if  y  was  non-random,  it  would  be
optimal  to  insure  fully  against  the  risk  of  X2,  i.e.,  I  =  Xi  - X2. The
optimal  insurance  in  the  presence  of  background  risk  is  greater  than,  equal
to  or  less  than  full  coverage  depending  upon  whether  -'(I)  evaluated  at  X1  -
3
X2  is greater  than,  equal  to  or  less  than  zero
If  I  =  X1  - X2,  notice  that
(6)  X2  +  Yi  +  (l-y)I  =  X2  +  Y  +  X 1 - X2  - yl  =  Xi  +  Y,  - I,.....i  =  1,2
3The  strict  concavity  of  the  utility  function  guarantees  the  strict
concavity  of  q'(I).
7Using  (6),
'(I)I  =xX2  =  (1  - X)yE[U'(Xi  +  y  - y  l)X 2]  - E[U'(XI  +  y  - yDl)IXl]
n'(I) i=x_  =  (1  -)'Y  Prob  (YlIX2 )  - Prob(YIIXi)]  [U'(Xi  +  Yi  - yI)
Since  Prob(Y1IX2)  - Prob(YjIX1)  =  Prob(Y2jXi)  - Prob(Y2JX 2),
1 '(1)  I=X  -_X2
=  (1 - y)  [Prob(YiIX2)  - Prob(YiXi)] [(U'(XI+YI-  Il) - U'(XI+  Y2  - I))
Without  loss  of  generality,  suppose  Yi  > Y2. Then,
='(  I  > 0  as  Prob(YiIX 2)  - Prob(Yi  Xi)  <  0.
I=X)-x2  Z  5
If  x  and  y  are  positively  (negatively)  correlated,  the  background  risk
increases  (decreases)  the  optimal  insurance  compared  to  the  no-background
risk  situation.  If  x  and  y  are  independent  random  variables,  the  randomness
in  y  does  not  affect  the  optimal  amount  of  insurance.
The Multiplicative Case
We  now  turn  to  the  case  of  independent  multiplicative  risks,  i.e.,  when
w =  xy.
By  the  independence  of  x  and  y,  the  first  order  condition  (4)  becomes
(7)  7'(I)  =  (1  - )[EY[U'(w(X 2 ,y)  +  (1  - )I)]  - EY[U'(w(X,y)  - I)]]  =  0
where  the  superscript  on  the  expectations  operator  denotes  that  the
expectations  are  with  respect  to  the  distribution  of  y.
For  the  exposition  it  is  convenient  to  regard  x  and  y  as  output  and
price  respectively  and to  consider  an  insurance  scheme  contingent  on
output  . It  is  also  a  description  of  the  ecr  omic  setting  in  agriculture
4We  could  just  as  well  have  considered  price  insurance.  The  analysis
equally  applies  to  the  choice  of  optimal  hedge  under  production  uncertainty.where  crop  insurance  schemes  (contingent  on  output)  are. rendered  incomplete
by  price  risks.  Then  it  is  natural  to  extend  the  discussion  to  consider  the
existence  of  a  futures  market,  i.e.,  a  market  for  the  uninsurable  risk.
The  uncertain  elements  are  assumed  to  have  independent  probability
distributions  of  the  following  form
(  Q  with  probability  X
(8)  q=
Q2  with  probability  (1-x)
and
SP 1  with  probability  A
(9)  p  =
SP 2   with  probability  (1-A)
where  q  is  output  and  p  is  output  price.  Suppose  Qi  > Q 2  and  Pi  > P2 . The
value  of  output  is  a  random  variable  w  distributed  as:
W,  =  PIQI  with  probability  (1-y)A
W2  =  P2QI  with  probability  (l-'))(1-A)
(10)  w=
W3  =  PiQ2  with  probability  yA
W4  =  P2 Q2  with  probability  i(1l-y)
W  can  be  ordered  in  one  of  two  ways.  Either  W1  > W2  > W3  >  W4  or  W1  > W3  >
W2  > W4.
Denoting  as  r,  the  revenue  with  output  insurance,  we  have
R,  =  P1Qi  - 7I  with  probability  (1-y)A
R2  =  P2Q1  - yI  with  probability (l-7) (l-A)
(11)  r  =
R3  =  P1Q2 
+  (l-7)I  with  probability  yA
R4 =  P2Q2 +  (l-y)I  with  probability  y(l-A)
9From  (7),  the  optimal  output  insurance  satisfies5
(12)  EP[U'(pQ2  +  (1  - y)I)1  =  EP[U'(pQi  - yI)]
An  immediate  consequence  is  the  following.
Proposition  1  Let  I*  be  the  optimal  level  of  insurance.  Then
Ri(I*)  > R3(I*)  > R4(I*)  > R2(I*)  or  equivalently
P1(Qi - Q2)  >  I*  > P2(Q1  - Q2)
Proof  From  (10)  note  that  R3  > R4  for  all  I.  So  what  needs  to  be
shown  is  RI(I*)  >  R3(I*)  and  R4(I*)  > R2(*).
From  the  first  order  condition,  I*  satisfies
(13)  XU'(R)  +  (1-UR  )  =  U'(R= )  +  (1-A)U'(R  )
where  RI  denotes  Rj(I*)  for  j  =  1,..,4.
Now  let  7 i(I)  =  U'(R 3 )  - U'(RI)  and  ) 2 (I)  =  U'(R 2)  - U'(R 4).
Substituting  and  rearranging  terms,  (12)  becomes
(14)  Ai 2(I*)  - (l-A)72(I*)  =  0
Clearly,  %i(I*) and  02(I*)  must  both  be  of  the  same  sign.  Suppose  they  are
both  negative.
71  <  0  4  R3  >  R,  PiQ2  +  (l-7)I* > PiQ1  - 7yI
(15)  I  > P1 (Ql-Q 2 )
1)2  <  0  * R*  >R  P2Q1  -l I *  > P2Q 2 
+  (l-2)I*
(16)  =  P2(Q  - Q2)  > I*
Combining  the  two  inequalities,  we  get  P2  > P1  which  is  not  possible.  For
a  similar  reason  yz  and  )q2  cannot  both  be  zero;  so  both  of  them  have  to  be
5The  optimal  output  insurance  is  strictly  positive  because
7'(I)[  =0  =  y(1-7)EPl[U'(pQ 2 )]  - EP[U ' (pQ)]}  > 0  by  the  strict  concavity  of  U
and  from  the fact  pQ1 > pQ2  for  all  p.
10positive.  This  means  R3 < Ri  and  R  < R4. Since  R3 > R4, we  obtain  the
ordering  RI  > R3 > R4 > R2. Notice  also  that  the  inequalities  in  (15)  and
(16)  are  reversed  and  so  we  obtain  upper  and  lower  bounds  on  the  optimal
amount  of  insurance  ,  i.e.,  Pi(Q1  - Q2)  >  I*  > P2(Q1  - Q 2)
The  complete  ordering  of  the  Rj's  is  a  direct  consequence  of  risk  averse
behavior  and  the  first  order  condition  (12).  Recall,  that  in  the  absence  of
insurance,  we  know  that  either  W i >  W2  > W3  > W4  or  W i > W3  > W2  >  W4 . In
either  case  the  worst  income  state  was  W4  when  both  price  and  output  are  low.
With  insurance,  however,  the  ordering  changes  in  a  significant  way;  the  worst
income  state  is  R2,  when  price  is  low  but  output  is  high.  In  this  state,
premium  payments  have  to  be  made,  even  though  the  individual  suffers  losses
due  to  low  prices.  For  the  individual  seeking  output  insurance,  its  incomplete
nature  creates  a  difficult  trade-off  between  output  and  price  risks.  While
output  risks  are  clearly  reduced,  the  individual  is  worse  off  in  the  low
price-high  output  state  R2 . Further  the  fact  that  R2  decreases  with  greater
purchase  of  insurance,  suggests  that  I*  cannot  be  "too  high".  The  argument  is
made  more  precise  in  the  following  propositions.
III.  THE  EFFECT  OF  PRICE  RISK
Proposition  2  If  pe  is  expected  output  price,  then
(i)  I*  < pe(Qi  Q 2 )  if  U"'(.)  >  0
(ii)  I*  =  pe(Q 1   Q2)  if  U"'(.)  =  0
(iii)  I*  > pe(Q  - Q 2 )  if  U"'(.)  <  0
Proof  We  will  consider  the  case  when  U"'  is  strictly  positive.  It  is
straightforward  to  alter  the  reasoning  for  the  cases  when  U"'  is  zero  or
negative.  The  proof  consists  in  showing  7'(I)  to  be  negative  for  all  I  l
11pe(Qi  - Q2) 6
Let  rc(p)  denote  the  random  income  in  the  high  output  states  and
rB(p)  the  random  income  in  low  output  states.  So
R1  =  P1Q1  - 'I  with  probability  A
(17)  rG(P)  =  PQi  - I  =  R2  =P 2Q  - ;I  with  probability  (l-A)
R3  =  P1Q2  +  (l-y)I  with  probability  A
(18)  r(p) =  PQ2  +  (1-)I =  R4  =  P2Q2  +  (1-')I with  probability  (1-A)
Then  r'(I) can  be  written  more  compactly  as
'(I)  =  y(1-)  {EPU'(rc(p))  - EPU'(rB(p))
The  sign  of  7)'(I)  depends  on  the  difference  in  expected  marginal
utilities  between  low  and  high  output  states.  Now,
rG(p)  - rB(p)  =  pQ1  - yl  - pQ2  - (1  - y)I  =  p(Q 1  - Q2)  - I.
So  EPU'(rc(p))  =  EPu'(rB(p)  +  p(Qi  - Q2)  - I)
Let  v(p)  =  p(Q  - Q2)  - p(Q 1  - Q2)
v(P1)  > O,  v(P2 )  <  0  and  EPv(p)  =  0.  Then
EPU'(rG)  =  EPU'(rB  +  v  +  pe(Q  - Q2)  - I)
If  I  a  pe(Q 1  - Q2),  EPU'(rc)  &  EPU'(rB  +  v)  > EU'(rB)  where  the  second
inequality  follows  from  the  convexity  of  the  marginal  utility  (U"'  > 0)
and  from  the  observation  that  (rg  +  v)  is  a  mean  preserving  spread  of  rG
Therefore,  the  optimal  insurance  is  less  than the  expected  value  of  output
'oss.
6This  is  enough  since  4r is  strictly  concave  in  I.
"(I)  =  y(1-y)(XAI 1'(I)  - (l-A)i 2'(1))  where  qi 1'(I)  =  U"(R 3)(l-y)  +  U"(R 1)y  < 0
and  7)'(I)  =  -yU"(R 2)  - (1-y)U"(R 4 )  > 0.
12The  result  for  the  complete  market  case  is  the  following.
Proposition  3  If  output  price  is  certain  at  the  mean  (P1=  P2  =  pe),
then  I*  =  pe(Qi  - Q2)
Proof  P1  =  P2  =R  R1  =  R2  and  R3  =  R4 . The  first  order  conditions  reduce
to  U'(R 1)  =  U'(R 3)  or  Ri  =  R3  which  implies  I*  =  pe(ql  - q2).
If  we  refer  to  pe(Q 1  - Q2)  as  the  complete  insurance,  then  proposition  2
compares  the  optimal  level  of  incomplete  insurance  to  the  complete  insurance.
Under  the  reasonable  assumption  of  a  positive  U",  ,  incompleteness  reduces
the  optimal  insurance.
The  next  proposition  is  concerned  with  the  "marginal"  impact  of  price
uncertainty  i.e.  the  effect  of  making  a  given  distribution  "slightly  more
risky".  Following  Rothschild  and  Stiglitz  a  mean  preserving  increase  in  price
risk  is  represented  by  a  decrease  in  price  which  leaves  the  mean  unchanged.
Since  pe  =  APi  +  (1  - X)P2,  dP1/dP 2  =  - (1  - A)/A.
Proposition  4  For  the  class  of  utility  functions  with  a  positive  (zero,
negative)  third  derivative  everywhere,  an  increase  in  price  risk  reduces
(leaves  unchanged,  increases)  the  optimal  level  of  insurance.
The  proof  is  in  appendix  A.
IV.  THE  EFFECT  OF  RISK  AVERSION
If  U1  and  U2  are  two  utility  functions,  U1  is  said  to  be  globally  more
risk  averse  than  U2  if  -U 1"(x)/Ul'()  :  -U2"(x)/U 2'(x)  for  all  x.  The
following  theorem,  proved  by  Pratt,  is  useful  for  later  results.
Theorem  (Pratt) The  following  conditions  are  equivalent
7The  subset  of  the  class  of  concave  utility  functions  which
satisfies  U'"  > 0  includes  all  constant  and  decreasing  absolute
risk  aversion  utility  functions.
13(a)  -Ul"(x)/U 1 '(x)  - -U 2"(x)/U 2'(x)  for  all  x  [and  > for  at  least  one  x]
(b)  Ui(y)  - Ul(x)  < U2(y)  - U2 (x)  for  all  v,  w,  x,  y  with  v  <  w  - x  < y
U1(w)  - U1(v)  U2 (w)  - U2(v)
Before  we  state  the  proposition,  a  little  notation  is  helpful.  Let  Vj(.)
S-Uj'(.),  Auj  =  -(Uj"/Uj')  and  Avj  =  -(Vj"/Vj')  for  j =  1,2,  i.e.,  Auj  and
Avj  are  the  risk  aversion  functions  with  respect  to  the  utility functions  Uj
and  Vj  respectively.  Also  let  I1  and  12  be  optimal  levels  of  insurance  for
individuals  1  and  2  respectively.  The  proposition  below  makes  use  of  a
condition  about  the  change  in  the  curvature  of  the  marginal  utility  as risk
aversion  increases.  The  condition  is
(CMU)  Aul(x)  - Au2(x)  for  all  x  [and  > for  at  least  one  x]
*  Av,(x)  2  Av2(x) for  all  x  [and  > for at  least  one  x]
From  Pratt's  work,  we  know  that  when  Aula  Au2,  U1  is  a  concave  transformation
of  U2. The  CMU  condition  says  that  increasing  risk  aversion  also  results  in
a  concavifying  transformation  of  the  V  (or  -U')  function.  This  property  is
exhibited  by  the  constant  absolute  risk  aversion  (CARA)  and  the  constant
relative  risk  aversion  (CRRA)  utility  functions.  This  is  verified  in
appendix  B.
Proposition  5  For  utility  functions  satisfying  the  CMU  condition,  an  increase
in  risk  aversion  reduces  the  optimal  amount  of  insurance  i.e.,
*8
Auj(x)  Au2(x)  for  all  x  [and  > for  at  least  one  x]  =  I1  < 1  .
Proof  Let  ^j  denote  the  expected  utility  of  the  jth  individual  where
rij(I)  =  (l-'y)AUj(Ri)  +  (I-y)(l-A)Uj(R2)  +  XAUj(R 3 )  +  y(l-X)Uj(R 4 )
8Note  that  if  PI  =  P2  =  p,  i.e.,  a  situation  of  complete  insurance,  then  as
shown  in  Proposition  3,  the  optimal  insurance  is  I*  =  p(ql  - q2)  which  is
independent  of  the  agent's  risk  attitudes.
14Since  Uj"  < O,  7j"'(.)  < 0  for  all  I.  To  prove  I  <  I,  it  is  then
enough  to  show  -q2'(.)I  =i  > 0.
If  satisfies
l'(I)  =  y(1-)A(Ui'(R3(I))  - Ui'(RI(I)))
+  (1-A)(U 1'(R 4(I*)  - UI'(R2(If)))}  =  0
=  (19)  UI'(R3(*))  - U'C(Ri(I))  =  (1-A)/A
U1'(R 2(1))  - UI'(R 4 1))
or  Vi(Ri(It))  - V1(R3(I))  =  (1-A)/A  since  Vj  =  -Uj',j  =  1,2.
Vi(R 4(Id))  - VI(R 2 ( I))
By  the  CMU  condition  A, 1  2  Av2 . Applying  Pratt's  theorem  to  the  V  function,
(20)  Vi(Ri(It))  - Vi(R3(Id))  < V2(R(It))  - V2(R3(I))
V1(R4(I  ))  - V(R 2(I1))  V2(R 4(I  ))  - V2(R 2(1))
since,  by  Proposition  1,  R1(I  )  > R3(IR)  > R4(I  )  > R2 I).
(19)  and  (20)  imply
(21)  U2 '(R 3(I*))  - U2'(Ri(Ij))  >  (l-X)/A
U2 '(R 2(I 1))  - (R4(I))
or
(22)  A(U2'(R 3(I  ))  - U2 '(R 1 (I9)))  +  (1-X)(U 2'(R 4(I)  - '(R 2(I)))  >
Therefore,  2 (I)  =  (1-  (U2'(R 3 (I))  -2'(R(I)))
+  (l-A)(U2'(R 4(Ia )  - U2'(R 2(I)))  > 0  o
V.  THE  INTRODUCTION  OF  A  FUTURES  MARKET
The  characterization  of  insurance  schemes  as  complete  or  incomplete  is
intimately  tied  to  the  presence  or  absence  of  the  appropriate  risk markets.
The  incomplete  aspects  of  crop/output  insurance  arise  largely  out  of  the
absence  of  the  markets  for  price  risk.  But,  of  course,  markets  for  price  risk
(e.g.,  forward  and  futures  markets)  are  available  for  some  commodities.  This
section  examines  the  relation  between  crop  insurance  schemes  and  futures
15markets9. This  issue  is  also  of  policy  interest  because  crop  insurance  schemes
are  generally  sponsored  by  the  government,  while,  futures  markets  are
privately  organized.
To  introduce  a  futures  market,  consider  a  two  period  model  where  a
farmer  makes  hedging  decisions  (and  crop  insurance  decisions  if  insurance  is
available)  at  time  1.  The futures  contracts  are  for  the  duration  of  one
period  - i.e.,  if  the  farmer  buys  a  contract  at  time  1 he  agrees  to  deliver
the  specified  quantity  of  the  commodity  at  time  2.  At  time  2,  output  is
realized  and  the  uncertainty  about  the  spot  price  is  resolved.  If  the
futures  market  is  unbiased  (as  is  the  assumption  here),  pf  the  futures  price
is  equal  to  pe,  the  expected  spot  price  . Let  f  denote  the  farmer's  position
in  the  futures  market.
In  this  section,  it  is  convenient  for the  purpose  of  exposition  to
specify  the  insurance  to  be  of  the  form  where  I  =  p(q,  - q2 )  where  p  is  the
co  insurance  parameter.  Since  the  size  of  loss  is  fixed,  a  specification  of
the  above  kind  is  no  restriction  on  I;  choosing  the  optimal  p  is  equivalent
to  choosing  the  optimal  I.  Following  crop  insurance  practice  in  the  U.S.",  p
9The  distinction  between  futures  and  forward  markets  is  ignored
here.
'1In  other  words,  we  are  considering  a  pure  hedger.  Since  pr  =  Epe,  the farmer
who  has  a  position  in  the  forward  market  cannot  expect  to  make  any  speculative
profits.  The  unbiasedness  assumption  is  therefore  a  condition  for
fair  insurance  and  in  this  case  the  futures  position  exists  only  because  of
hedging  considerations.  In  general,  the  futures  position  consists  of  hedging
and  speculative  components.  In  a  mean-variance  context,  the  futures  posit'  n
can  be  quite  easily  be  decomposed  into  its  components  (see  Anderson  and
Danthine  or  Newberry  and  Stiglitz,  Ch  13).  The  empirical  evidence  on  the
existence  of  bias  in  futures  markets  is  mixed  but  unbiasedness  is  usually  a
reasonable  assumption  for  markets  with  active  trading.  See  Peck  for  a
collection  of  papers  on  this  subject.
1For  a  description  see  the  report  by  the  General  Accounting  Office,  1984.
16can  also  be  regarded  as  the  "price-election"  which  is  the  price  at  which  the
insurance  company  compensates  the  farmer  for  a  unit  loss  of  the  commodity.
The  farmer's  revenue  for  a  price  election  of  p  and  a  hedge  of  f  is
distributed  as
R1  =  PiQ1  - p(Q1-Q 2)  +  (pe  Pi)f  with  probability  (1  - )A
(22)  r  =  R2  =  P2Q1  - yP(Qi-Q 2 )+  (pe  P 2 )f  with probability  (1 - ')(l  - A)
SR 3  =  PiQ2  +  (1  - )P(Q 1-Q 2)  +  (pC  - Pi)f  with probability  yA
R4  =  P2Q 2  +  (1  - n)p(QI-Q2 )  +  (pe  _  P2 )f  with  probability  (1  - A)y
The  farmer's  problem  is
Max  7(p,f)  =   (1  - )AU(Ri)  +  (1  - )(l  - A)U(R 2)  +  ~XU(R 3 )
pf
+  y(1  - A)U(R 4)
It  is  easy  to  show  that  the  optimal  hedge  and  insurance  are  strictly
positive.  Therefore,  they  satisfy  the  first order  conditions
(23)  - =  (1  - y)y(Q1-Q2)[RU'(R 3 )  +  (1  - A)U'(R 4)-  AU'(RI)  - (l-A)U'(R 2 )]  =  0
P
and  f  =  M(l  - -)U'(R1)  +  U'(R 3)](pe  - P)
+  (1  - A)[(l  - ')U'(R 2)  +  yU'(R 4)](p e  - P2)  =  0
Substituting  for  pe  =  AP1  +  (1  - A)P2
(24)
f  =  X(1-A)(PI  - P2 )[(1  - )U'(R 1)  + TU'(R 3)  - (1  - y')U'(R 2 )  - yU'(R 4)]  =  0
(23)  and  (24)  can  be  expressed  more  compactly  in  terms  of  the  conditional
distributions  of  r.  As  defined  earlier,  rG(p)  and  rB(p)  are  the  random  income
in  the  high  output  ("good")  and  low  output  ("bad")  states.
Sf  RI  with  probability  A rQi  r(p)  - R2  with  probability  (1-A)  and
r  Q2  rB()  R3  with  probability  (-
rQ  "  R3  with  probability  A R.  with probability  (1-A)
Similarly,  the  distribution  of  revenue  conditional  on  price  is
riP1   rH(q)  _ f  R1  with  probability  (1-)  and
R3 with  probability  '
17rj  L(p  R2  with  probability  (1-Y)
rP2  rL(P)  R4  with  probability  z
rH(q)  and  rL(p)  are  the  random  income  in  the  high  and  low  price  states
respectively.
Then  the  first  order  conditions  become
(25)  Tp  =  (1  - ')y(Qi  - Q2)[EPU'(rB(p))  - EPU'(rG(p))]  =  0
(26)  f  =  A(l  - A)(P 1  - P2)[EqU'(r(q))  - EqU'(rH(q)) ]  =  0
where  the  superscript  indicates  the  random  variable  over  which  expectations
are  taken.  The  optimal  insurance  equates  the  expected  marginal  utility
across  the  good  and  bad  output  states  while  the  optimal  hedge  equates  the
expected  marginal  utility  across  the  high  and  low  price  states  .
Proposition  6:  Let  p*  and  f*  be  the  optimal  insurance  and  forward  position.
Then  Qi  > f*  >  Q2  and  Pi  > p*  > P2-
For  a  proof  please  see  appendix  A.
The  question  that  is  of  interest  is  whether  the  existence  of  hedging
opportunities  affects  the  optimal  insurance.  To  be  more  concrete,  we  wish
to  compare  the  optimal  insurance  solved  from  (25)  and  (26)  with  the  optimal
insurance  when  there  are  no  futures  markets.  This  is  best  achieved  by
considering  a  model  where  the  farmer's  choice  of  the  hedge  is  constrained
i.e.,
Maxf  -(p,f)  =  (1  - y)AU(Ri)  +  (1  - y)(l  - X)U(R 2)  +  yAU(R 3 )
(p, f)
+  y(l  - A)U(R 4)
1  Note  that  the  optimality  conditions  do  not  equate  the  marginal  utility
across  all  states  of  income.  This  means  that  some  risk  markets  are  still
absent.  This  is  not  surprising  since  the  relevant  state  of  the  world,  for
which  contingent  claims  must  exist  to  complete  markets,  is  crop  revenue,
i.e.,  w  =  p  x  q.
18subject  to  f  - f
If  f  =  0,  the  situation  corresponds  to  the  absence  of  futures  markets.  By
the  Kuhn-Tucker  theorem,  there  exists  a  1i  - 0  such  that
(27)  EPu'(rB(p))  - EPU'(rG(p))  =  0
(28)  A(1  - A)(P 1  - P2)[EqU'(rn(q))  - EU'(rH(q))]  =
(29)  A(f  - f)  =  0
(30)  a  0
Since  we  want  to  investigate  the  effect  of  the  opening  up  of  a  futures
market,  suppose  that  f  is  small  enough  (less  than  the  unconstrained  optimum
f*)  to  be  a  binding  constraint  i.e.,  p  > 0.  Let  pf  and  f4 denote  the
constrained  solution  to  (27)-(30).  From  (28),
EqU'(rL(q))  - EqU'(rH(q))  =  g/[A(1  - A)(P 1  - P2)]  > 0.
Because  of  insufficient  hedging,  the  expected  marginal  utility  in  the  low
price  state  remains  higher  than  the  expected  marginal  utility  in  the  high
price  states.  The  optimal  crop  insurance,  however,  equates  the  expected
marginal  utility  across  the  high  and  low  output  states.  Consequently,  from
the  argument  in  Proposition  6,
Proposition  7:  RI  > R3  and  R*  >  R2
Suppose  f  were  to  be  increased  i.e.,  the  constraint  is  made  less
binding.  What  is  the  effect  on  pf  ?  In  the  appendix  (proof  of  Proposition  8
below)  it  is  shown  that  pf  responds  positively  to  an  increase  in  f.  Since  the
case  of  no  futures  markets  corresponds  to  an  extreme  constraint,  the  existence
of  futures  markets  leads  to  an  increase  in  the  optimal  output  insurance.
Proposition  8  The  existence  of  futures  markets  increases  (decreases,  leaves
unchanged)  the  optimal  insurance  if  the  third  derivative  of  the  utility
19function  is  positive  (negative  or  zero).
Since  the  problem  of  choosing  the  optimal  hedge  under  production
uncertainty  is  conceptually  equivalent  to  the  problem  of  choosing  the
optimal  price  election  under  price  risk,  a  corollary  to  Proposition  8  would
be  that  the farmers  choose  larger  hedge  positions  in  the  presence  of  crop
13 insurance  .
VI.  INCENTIVE  IMPLICATIONS
The  analysis  so  far  has  abstracted  from  any  considerations  of  the
farmer's  actions  which  may  affect  the  probability  distribution  of  output.
If  insurance  contracts  are  contingent  on  the  farmer's  actions  as  well  as
output,  then  the  optimal  contract  will  once  again  equalize  the  expected
marginal  utilities  across  the  high  and  the  low  states  of  output  and  the
results  of  the  earlier  sections  will  go  through  unaltered.  If,  however,  the
insurer  cannot  observe  the  actions  of  the  farmer,  the  contracts  remain
contingent  on  output  alone  and  the  optimal  contract  will  have  to  be
consistent  with  the  farmer's  choice  of  action  described  by  the  incentive
constraint. This  section  studies  how  the  introduction  of  the  incentive
constraint  alters  the  optimal  amount  of  insurance.  This  also  necessitates  a
restatement  of  the  effect  of  background  risk.
Let  z  represent  the  farmer's  choice  of  action.  To  be  concrete,  we  could
consider  z  as  the  input  or  the  effort  used  to  produce  the  output  q  The
probability  distribution  of  output  depends  on  the  chosen  action,
' 3For  a  treatment  of  hedging  decisions  under  output  uncertainty,  see  Losq
20i  Qi  with  probability  (1 - y(z))
q  Q2 with  probability  y(z)
The  probability  of  crop  failure  will  be  assumed  to  decline  with  greater
effort,  i.e.,  y'(z)  5  0.  Also  the  farmer's  utility  is  taken  to  be
separable  in  income  r  and  effort  z,  i.e.,  total  utility  is  U(r)  - C(z)  where
U  is  increasing,  concave  and  thrice  differentiable  and  C(.)  is  the  cost  of
taking  action  z.  It  is  assumed  that  the  farmer  dislikes  working  harder,  i.e.,
C'(z)  > 0.
The  optimal  contract  is  found  by  solving  the  following  program




(32)  "'(z){AU(R 3)  +  (1-A)U(R 4)  - AU(Ri)  - (1-A)U(R 2))  - C'(z)  =  0
where  the  Ri's are  defined  in  (11)14  and  (32)  is  the  first  order  condition  for
maximizing  the  farmer's  expected  utility  with  respect  to  z.  (32),  which  is
the  incentive  constraint15  ensures  the  consistency  of  the  optimal
contract  with  the  action  chosen  by  the  farmer.  (32)  can  be  rewritten  as
(33)  EPU(rB(p))  - EPU(rG(p))  =  C'(z)/-X'(z)
Since  the  RHS  of  (33)  is  non-negative,  the  optimal  contract,  in  order  to
preserve  incentives,  is  such  that  the  expected  utility  in  the  low  output
'4Notice  that  the  fair  insurance  condition  is  already  embedded  in  the
objective  function.
1sMore  generally,  the  incentive  constraint  is  z  E  argmax  EU(r)  - C(z').  This  is
z'
equivalent  to  (29)  if  EU(r)  - C(z)  is  strictly  concave  in  z  which  is
guaranteed  by  the  convexity  of  y  and  C,  i.e.,  y"(z) > 0  and  C"(z)  > 0.  See
Rogerson.
21states  is  greater  than  the  expected  utility  in  the  high  output  states.
Let  I*  be  the  solution  to  the  unconstrained  problem  (i.e.,  the  optimal
insurance  without  the  incentive  constraint)  and  I*  be  the  solution  to  the
constrained  problem.  Then  it  is  easy  to  see  that  I*  - I**.  The  inequality  is
strict  if  I*  does  not  satisfy  the  incentive  constraint.  The  following
result  is  helpful  in  assessing  the  circumstances  in  which  I*  violates  the
constraint.
Proposition  9  The  unconstrained  solution  I*  has  the  following  property
(i)  EPU(rc(p))  > EPU(rB(p))  for  decreasing  absolute  risk
aversion  utility  functions
(ii)  EPU(rc(p))  =  EPU(rB(p))  for  constant  absolute  risk
aversion  utility  functions
(iii)  EPU(rG(p))  <  EPU(rB(p))  for  increasing  absolute  risk  aversion
utility  functions
where  the  utilities  are  evaluated  at  I  =  I*
Proof:  See  Appendix  A.
Thus,  if  I  =  I*,  the  incentive  constraint  is  violated  whenever  the
utility  function  exhibits  constant  or  increasing  risk  aversion.  In  such
instances,  the  optimal  incentive  compatible  insurance  (I**)  will  be  smaller
than  I*.  In  the  case  of  decreasing  risk  aversion,  the  nature  of  constraint
depends  upon  the  marginal  cost  of  actions  C'(z).  For  small  C'(z),  the
constraint  will  not  be  violated  and  the  optimal  insurance  will  still  be  that
which  equates  the  expected  m  rginal  utilities  acro.s  tht.  two  output  states.
In  general,  the  incentive  problem  is  least  serious  for  decreasing  risk
averse  individuals  simply  because  their  insurance  coverage  is  already
22curtailed  by  price  risk  .
We  now  turn  to  the  issue  of  the  effect  of  price  risk  on  the  optimal
incentive  compatible  insurance.  If  the  incentive  constraint  is  not  binding,
previous  results  are  unaltered.  So  suppose  now  that the  incentive  constraint
is  binding.  The  first  order  condition  for  maximizing  (31)  subject  to  (33)  is
y(l  - y)(EPU'(rB)  - EPU'(rc))  - 1(yEPU'(rc)  +  (1  - y)EPU'(rB))  =  0
where  pi  is  the  Lagrange  multiplier  or
y(l  - Y)(EPU'(rB)  - EPU'(rC))  =  y(~EPU'(rc)  +  (1  - y)EPU'(rB))
When  the  incentive  constraint  is  binding,  the  optimal  insurance  does  not
equate  the  expected  marginal  utilities.  Instead,  to preserve  incentives,  the
optimal  insurance  I**  is  less  than  I*  and  consequently  EPU'(rB)  > EPU'(rG).
Proposition  10  I*  < Pi(Q1  - Q2)
Proof  In  Proposition  1  it  was  shown  that  I*  < P1(Q1  - Q2).  Since  I*  :  I**,
the  result  follows.  Note  the  above  result  could  also  be  rewritten  as  RT  >
R3.
Proposition  11  Suppose  the  optimal  amount  of  insurance  is  at  least  as  great
16Imai,  Geanakoplos  and  Ito  report  a  result  opposite  to  ours.  They  consider
unemployment  insurance  schemes  where  severance  payments  are  made  to  laid-off
workers.  But  "since  severance  payments  usually  do  not  depend  on  outcomes  at
alternative  opportunities  after  layoff  they  are  considered  at  best
incomplete  insurance  for  layoff"  (Ito).  The  issue  that  is  investigated  is
whether  the  laid  off  worker  could  be  better  off,  in  an  ex-ante  sense,  than
the  retained  worker.  This  is  indeed  the  case  for  individuals  with  decreasing
risk  averse  utility  functions.  Individuals  with  constant  risk  aversion
utility  functions  are  indifferent  between  the  two  states  while  increasing
risk  averse  individuals  prefer  to  be  retained.  So,  the  incentive  problem  is
most  serious  for  decreasing  risk  averse  individuals.  The  difference  between
their  model  and  ours  lies  in  the  assumption  about  the  uninsured  variable.
The  uncertainty  in  the  rehiring  wage,  in  the  Imai  et.al  model,  affects  only
the  marginal  benefit  of  insurance  (the  expected  marginal  utility  if  the
worker  is  laid  off)  and  not  the  marginal  cost  (the  marginal  utility  of  the
sure wage  net  of  premium  payments).  See  Ito  and  Machina,  and  Ito  for further
variants  of  the  problem.
23as  value  of  the  crop  loss  in  the  low  price  state.  Then,  if  U"'  >  0,
increasing  price  risk  reduces  the  optimal  amount  of  insurance.  If  the
optimal  insurance  is  smaller  than  the  value  of  the  crop  loss  in  the  low
price  state,  the  effects  of  increasing  price  risk  are  indeterminate.
Proof  The  first  order  condition  for  optimal  insurance  is
(34)  '(l  - y)(EPU'(re)  - EPU'(rc))  - g(yxEPU'(rG)  +  (1  - y)EPU'(rB))  =  0
Concavity  of  the  utility  function  guarantees  the  satisfaction  of  second
order  conditions.  So  the effect  of  price  risk  on  I*  depends  on  how
the  LHS  of  (34)  responds  to  changes  in  price  risk.
Consider  the  case  when  I*  > P2(Q1  - Q2).  Then  R  > R2.  Combining  with
Proposition  10,  we  have  R1  >  R3  >  R4  >  R2.  This  inequality  and  the  positivity
of  U"'  is  sufficient  for  increases  in  price  risk  to  negatively  affect  the
first  term  of  (34)  (see  Proposition  4).  On  the  other  hand,  a  mean  preserving
increase  in  price  risk  increases  (yEPU'(rc)  +  (1  - v)EPU'(rB))  which  is  a
linear  combination  of  two  convex  functions.  Therefore,  the  sum  effect  of  an
increase  in  price  risk  is  to  decrease  the  the  terms  on  the  LHS  of  (34),  and
hence  the  optimal  amount  of  insurance  is  reduced.
If  I*  < P2(Q1  - Q2 ),  then  it  is  not  possible  to  sign  the  response  of
the  first  term  in  the  LHS  of  (34)  to  an  increase  in  price  risk.  Therefore,
the  net  effect  is  indeterminate.
VII.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
This  paper  has  explored  some  properties  of  incomplete  insurance
schemes.  The  basic  idea  motivating  all  insurance  schemes  is  that  the  insured
individual  pays  premiums  in  "good"  times  in  return  for  protection  during  "bad"
times.  This  idea  is,  however,  weakened  by  an  output  insurance  scheme  which
does  not  make  fine  enough  distinctions  between  the  various  income
24states.  The  optimality  condition  requires  the  equalization  of  the  expected
marginal  utility  across  the  output  states  of  nature.  This  reflects  the  fact
that  the  incomplete  insurance  scheme  transfers  income  from  the  high
output  to  the  low  output  states.  The  costs  of  this  transfer  are  borne  in  the
high  output  states  which  includes  the  state  of  the  world  when  output  is
high  but  price  is  low.  Insurance  is,  therefore,  less  attractive  to
individuals  who  dislike  the  prospect  of  a  cash  drain  (due  to  premium  payments)
at  a  time  of  a  loss  in  value  of  the  output.
If  the  actions  of  farmers  are  not  observable,  optimal  insurance  contracts
have  to  be  consistent  with  the  incentive  constraint.  For  decreasing  risk
averse  individuals,  even  without  the  incentive  constraint,  the  insurance  is  so
weak  that  they  prefer  the  high  output  states  to  the  low  output  states  i.e.,
EPU(rc(p))  >  EPU(rB(p)).  For  this  reason,  the  potential  moral  hazard
associated  with  an  insurance  contract  that  equalizes  expected  marginal
utilities,  is  least  serious  for  this  class  of  utility  functions  and  the
incompleteness  due  to  price  risk  helps  resolve  the  incentive  problem.
In  general,  moral  hazard  considerations  may  lead  to  a  decline  in  the
amount  of  optimal  insurance.  If  the  resulting  insurance  coverage  is  so  limited
as  to be  less  than  the  value  of  output  loss  in  the  low  price  state,  the  effect
of  increasing  price  risk  is  ambiguous.  However,  if  insurance  is  at
"significant"  levels,  i.e.,  greater  than  P2(Q1  - Q2),  increasing  price  risk
will  reduce  the  optimal  amount  of  insurance.
The  results  of  this  paper  extend  to  all  insurance  schemes  which  are
incomplete  due  to  multiplicative  risks.  The  implications  of  these  results  will
depend  on  the  specific  context  in  which  multiplicative  risks  arise.  In  this
chapter,  by  way  of  example,  we  have  highlighted  the  incompleteness  in
25crop  insurance  caused  by  price  risk.  In  the  U.S.,  crop  insurance  is  an  element
of  agricultural  policy  and  recent  policies  have  emphasized  federal  crop
insurance  as  the  most  appropriate  way  for  taxpayers  to  share  farmers'  risks
(Todd).  The  rationale  for  increasing  government's  financial  commitment  to
crop  insurance  rests  on  the  presumed  benefits  to  risk  reduction.  But,  as  we
have  argued  here,  the  incompleteness  of  crop  insurance  is  a  factor  which
limits  the transfer  of  risk  from  the  agricultural  sector  to  the  government.
In  this  connection,  there  have  been  suggestions  that  the  crop  insurance
program  be  transformed  into  a  scheme  insuring  crop  revenue/income  rather  than
crop  output  (Farm  Income  Insurance  Task  Force,  Offut).  Apart  from  the
daunting  complexity  of  administering  such  a  scheme,  the  effects  on  private
risk  markets  (futures,  options)  must  also  be  considered  (Petzel).  However,  as
our  results  indicate,  the  same  objective  might  be  achieved  by  exploiting  the
complementarity  between  crop  insurance  and  hedging  activity.  As  a  policy
option,  it  might  also  be  more  feasible  for  the  government  agencies  selling
insurance  to  work  with  the  futures  trading  organizations  and  the  managers  of
the  grain  elevators  in  order  to  jointly  market  crop  insurance  and  forward
contracts.
For  the  study  of  incomplete  insurance  schemes,  the  implications  of  our
analysis  are  principally  to  draw  attention  to  the  important  role  of
assumptions  about  utility  functions  and  about  the  interaction  between  multiple
risks.  Since  the  first  order  condition  involves  expected  marginal  utilities,
the  impact  of  the  background  risk  on  the  choice  of  optimal  insurance  will
depend  on  the  third  derivative  of  the  utility  function.  In  models  with
mean-variance  or  quadratic  utility  functions,  the  effects  of  background  risk
will  wash  out  unless  it  is  correlated  with  the  insurable  risk.  As  regards
26the  interaction  of  risks,  the  appropriate  specification  of  risks  will  have
to  be  guided  by  the  context.  In  this  chapter,  we  contrasted  the  additive  case
with  the  multiplicative  specification.  Many  real  world  incomplete  insurance
schemes  may  occur  in  settings  which  satisfy  neither  alternatives 7. For  this
reason,  it  might  be  worthwhile  in  future  investigations,  to  consider  more
general  structures  capable  of  accommodating  a  variety  of  cases.
7The  unemployment  insurance  scheme  considered  by  Imai,  Geanakoplos  and  Ito  is
an  example
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Proof  of  Proposition  4:
Since  q"(I)  < 0,  81*/8P 2  is  of  the  same  sign  as  aQ'(I)/aP2  evaluated  at  I*.
a8'(I)/P 2 1  I  =  y(1-7)  A(U"(R)Q 2  - U"(RI)Q 1)dP 1/dP2
- (1-A)(U"(R)Q  - U"(R)Q2
Substituting  for  dPi/dP2
a'(I)/8P2j*  =  (1-7)(1-A)  {U"(R))Q  - U"(R3)(Q 1- (Q1  - Q2))
+  U"(R  )(Qi-  (Q1  - Q2))  - U"(R2)Q1}.
=  y(1-y)(1-A)  {(U"(R)  - U"(R3))Qi
+  (U"(R  )  - U"(R2))Q1  +  (U"(R*)  - U"(R  ))(Qx  - Q 2
which  is  strictly  positive  (zero,  strictly  negative)  because  R*  > R3 > R4 >
R2  and  U"'  > (=,  ) 0.
Proof  of  Proposition  6:
Let  R*  denote  Rj  evaluated  at  the  optimal  insurance  and  hedge  level.
(20)  implies  (1  - y)[U'(R  )  - U'(Ri)]  =  y[U'(R  )  - U'(R  )]
*  R2  < Ri as  R3  _  R 4 5  5
Now  R  - R  =  (P2  - P1)Q1  +  (P 1  - P2)f*  =  (P1  - P2)(f* - Q1)  and
R  - R  =  (Pi  - P2)(Q2  - f*)
If  R2 > R  and  R  > R4, that  would  imply  f*  > Q1  and  Q2  > f*  which
contradicts  that  Q2  is  the  smaller  output.  Similarly,  R  =  R1  and  R3 =  R4 is
acontradiction.  Hence  R I > R2 and  R4 > R3 and  therefore  Qi  > f*  > Q2
(24)  implies
A[U'(R  )  - U'(R*)]  =  (1  - A)[U'(R  )  - U'(R  )]
3  2
Now  Ra - R1 =  P1Q2+  (1  - y)p*(Q-Q2)+  f*(pe  - P1)
28- P1Q 1  + 7p*(Qi-Q 2)  - f*(pe-  Pi)
=  (p*  - Pi)(Q-Q 2)  and  similarly
R  - R  ( 2  - )(Q1-Q 2)
If  R 3  > R  and  R  > R  that  would  imply  p*  > Pi  and  P2  > p*  which
contradicts  P1  being  the  higher  price.  Similarly  R  =  R,  and  R 2 =  R4 is  a
contradiction.  Hence  R3 < R i and  R  < R4 and  therefore,  P1  > P*  > P2-
Proof  of  Proposition  8:
The  strategy  is  to  apply  the  implicit  function  theorem  to  equations  (25)  and
(26)  to  discover  the  response  of  the  endogenous  variables  pr and  gL*  to  a
change  in  the  exogenous  variable  f.
The  general  statement  of  the  implicit  function  theorem  is  as  follows.  X
is  a  vector  of  choice  variables,  b  is  vector  of  parameters,  and  G  is  a
differential  map  such  that  G(Xo;b)  =  0  and  the  matrix  aG(Xo;b)/aX  =  DxG  is
non  singular.  Then  one  can  solve  for  a  differentiable  function  x*(b)  such
that  G(x*(b),b)  =  0  holds  as  an  identity.  Further  DbX*  -
[DxG(XO;b)-  [DbG(Xo;b)]
In  the  analysis  here,
X  =  ,  G=  ,  and  b  =  f,  where  L  is  the  Lagrangian  function  of  the
constrained  maximization  problem  i.e.,  L(p,f,i)  =  )  (p,f)  +  g1(f  - f).
Therefore,
Sap  /f  Lf  L  L
where  DxGI  =L  L  - L  L  =L  L  since  L  0.  Further  L  -1  and
PP fg  P  fp  LPP fi  P=  f=
L  =  pp is  also  negative  due  to  the  concavity  of  the  utility  function.
Hence  ( DxG  is  strictly  positive.
29ap*/af  =  [L  L[  - (L  )  ]  < 0  because  the  numerator  is  positive  by  the
IDxG  pp  ff 
p
second  order  sufficient  condition.
ap /af  =-  1  LfL  f]
IDxpf
Lf  =  -1  and  DxG  is  positive.  So  the  sign  of  p  f  depends  on  the  sign  of
L  which  is  equal  to  pf.
7p  =  (1  - )W(Qi-Q2)[Xu"(RR)(pe  - P1)  +  (  - )U(R)(pe  - P2
- AU"(R*)(pe  - Pi)  - (1  - .)U"(R)(pe  - P2)
=  (1  - )'Y(Q1-Q 2 )[A(U"(Rj)  - U"(R3))(P 1  - pe)
+  (1  - A)(U"(R*)  - U"(R))(pe  - P2 )
>  0  as  U"'>  0  because  R  > R3  and  R  > R2  (Proposition  7).
<  <
Proof  of  Proposition  9:
Define  the  inverse  of  the  marginal  utility  function  by  m:  m a  (U') -'.  Also
define  v  as  the  composite  function  of  u  and  m:  v  =  U  o  m.  Denoting  by  a  a
value  of  marginal  utility  of  income  the  following  relation  holds
v(a)  =  U(m(a))
Lemma:  v"(a)  is  greater  than,  equal  to,  or  less  than  zero  depending  on
whether  the  utility  function  exhibits  decreasing,  constant  or  increasing
absolute  risk  aversion.
Proof  of  lemma:  See  Imai,  Geanakoplos  and  Ito
From  the  first  order  condition  (to  the  unconstrained  maximum)
EU'(r(p))  U'(r(p)).  From  Proposition  1,  we  also  know  U'(R)  > U'(R)  >
U'(R  )  < U'(R  ).  At  the  optimum,  U'(rc)  is  a  mean  preserving  spread  of  U'(rg).
But  if  absolute  risk  aversion  is  decreasing,  v  is  a  strictly  convex  function
of  marginal  utility  (from  lemma).  Therefore  Ev(U'(rc))  =  EU(rc)  > EU(rB)  =
Ev(U'(rB))  The  proof  is  similar  for  other  cases.
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Auj'(x)  =  (Uj"/Uj) 2  - Uj"'/Uj'.  Dividing  throughout  by  Auj,  the  equation
becomes  Auj'(x)/Auj  =  Auj  - Aj  or
Auj  =  Avj  +  (Auj'(x)/Auj).
Consider  the  CARA  utility  function.  Since  Auj'  =  0,  Auj  =  Aj  and  the  CMU  is
verified.  If  the  utility  function  is  of  the  CRRA  type  with  k  as  the  constant
relative  risk  aversion  parameter,  Auj  =  kj/x  and  Auj'=  -kj/x 2. Therefore,  Aul
- Au2  implies  A, 1  - (kl/x 2)/(kl/x)  - Av2  - (k2/x 2 )/(k 2/x)  or  Avl  2  Av2  which
verifies  the  CMU  condition.
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